Foreign National and Principles of Extraterritoriality: Why Atamirzayeva v. United States Was Decided Incorrectly by Paraud, Andrea
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 59 
Issue 2 Winter 2010 Article 8 
2010 
Foreign National and Principles of Extraterritoriality: Why 
Atamirzayeva v. United States Was Decided Incorrectly 
Andrea Paraud 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Andrea Paraud, Foreign National and Principles of Extraterritoriality: Why Atamirzayeva v. United States 
Was Decided Incorrectly, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 559 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol59/iss2/8 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
FOREIGN NATIONALS AND PRINCIPLES OF
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: WHY A TAMIRZA YEVA V
UNITED STATES WAS DECIDED INCORRECTLY
Andrea Paraud+
Owning a business is a demanding job. It requires dedication, substantial
economic contributions, and major sacrifices. It is a labor of love. Imagine
that you own such a business. What would you do if someone demolished it,
rendering all of your hard work and sacrifice worthless? Most people would
expect some kind of compensation from the person or entity at fault. But what
happens when there is no remedy for the wrong?
On May 7, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
made a landmark decision, holding that the appellant, an Uzbek citizen, lacked
a sufficient connection to the United States to receive compensation under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.! In so doing, the Federal Circuit
abandoned precedent and defeated the purpose of the Takings Clause.
Since 1994, Zoya Atamirzayeva, an Uzbek citizen, owned a cafeteria called
"Feruza," which was located next to the U.S. Embassy in the city of Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.2 At the Embassy's request, and under its oversight, local Uzbek
authorities seized and destroyed Ms. Atamirzayeva's cafeteria in December
1999. 3 Embassy officials made this request in an effort to increase security.
4
After unsuccessfully seeking relief from local Uzbek authorities and Embassy
officials, Ms. Atamirzayeva brought her claim before the United States Court
of Federal Claims.5 Relying on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, among
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1. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2. Id.; Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. CI. 378, 379 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
3. Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 379.
4. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1321. According to Ms. Atamirzayeva's original complaint,
a U.S. Embassy security checkpoint now stands where her cafeteria was located. Complaint at 5,
Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (No. 05-1245L). In response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Congress enacted the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999, making $6.4 billion available to the U.S. Department of State to
buy or lease property adjacent to diplomatic facilities for the purpose of improving security.
Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 379. In addition, Ms. Atamirzayeva provided the Court of Federal
Claims with a letter from a local Uzbek official, stating that the U.S. demanded that local officials
destroy her cafeteria for security purposes. Id.
5. Complaint, supra note 4, at 7.
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other cases, the Court of Federal Claims held that Ms. Atamirzayeva lacked
standing to invoke the Takings Clause because she had not demonstrated a
substantial connection to the United States. 6 The Federal Circuit affirmed, also
basing its decision on the substantial-connection test established by Verdugo-
Urquidez.7 Although Ms. Atamirzayeva relied on Turney v. United States-a
case in which the Court of Claims upheld a foreign corporation's takings claim
against the U.S. govemment 8-- the Federal Circuit distinguished Turney from
Ms. Atamirzayeva's case based on the Turney corporation's substantial
connections to the United States.9 However, the court in Turney never relied
on a substantial-connection test in reaching its conclusion.
10
In general, three types of property are subject to foreign takings: (1)
"American-owned property located abroad"; (2) "alien-owned property located
6. Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 382-83, 386-87 (citing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990)).
7. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1324-26, 1328-29 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
274-75).
8. Tumey v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953). Turney involved a Filipino
corporation's takings claim against the United States. Id. at 458-60. Two former U.S. Air Force
members purchased an air depot that had been transferred to the Philippines by the United States,
and subsequently assigned the property to a corporation they formed. Id. at 458-59. Soon after,
the corporation's employees discovered classified military radar equipment among the supplies at
the depot. Id. at 459. After notifying U.S. military authorities, the U.S. military attempted to
repossess the property. Id. The parties eventually agreed to segregate the classified equipment
from the other supplies. Id. at 460. After segregating the equipment, the plaintiffs agreed to
return the radar equipment and the U.S. government agreed to give full receipt to the corporation.
Id. In addition, however, the corporation stated in the agreement that it planned to bring a claim
against the U.S. government. Id.
9. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1326-28. Specifically, the Federal Circuit pointed to three
connections to the United States that were present in Turney and absent in Atamirzayeva: (1) the
corporation in Turney was formed by two U.S. citizens; (2) these two citizens assigned the
corporation its ownership interest in the disputed property; and (3) after the corporation was
liquidated, a U.S. citizen, who was also a plaintiff in the case, was designated as the liquidating
trustee. Id. Ms. Atamirzayeva argued, however, that "it is well-established that 'regardless of the
place of residence or citizenship of the incorporators or shareholders, the sovereignty by which a
corporation was created, or the laws under which it was organized, determines its national
character."' Plaintiff-Appellant Mrs. Zoya Atamirzayeva's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 5,
Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (No. 07-5159) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing] (quoting 17
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8298 (perm. ed., rev. vol.
2006)). Furthermore, the Turney plaintiff sued on behalf of the corporation, not on his own
behalf as a U.S. citizen. Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 460-61. Therefore, Ms. Atamirzayeva argued,
the nationality of the liquidating trustee in Turney was irrelevant. Petition for Rehearing, supra,
at 7.
10. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1328; Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64; see also Petition for
Rehearing, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1328) (explaining that even the
Federal Circuit in Atamirzayeva noted that the court in Turney did not expressly state that a
plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial connection to the United States in order to seek relief
under the Fifth Amendment).
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within the United States;"; and (3) "alien-owned property located abroad."'"
Vagueness and confusion surround this topic, particularly with respect to the
third category, because the United States Supreme Court has never clearly
decided whether the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies extraterritorially
to non-enemy, or friendly, foreign nationals.12  Instead of providing
clarification, the Federal Circuit's holding furthers the confusion regarding the
third type of foreign taking-the taking of alien-owned property located
abroad.
Although both the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit relied on
the substantial-connection test in ruling against Ms. Atamirzayeva, 13 new
developments show that Verdugo-Urquidez's substantial-connection test is not
the appropriate approach for courts to follow. 14 A vast body of case law also
indicates that the Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit should not have used
the substantial-connection test to decide Atamirzayeva.'5 The Federal Circuit
erred when it applied this test and, in the process, essentially overturned
Turney,16 one of the most important cases regarding the extraterritorial
application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
17
This Comment will examine longstanding precedent and new developments
regarding the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to friendly
aliens whose property is located in a foreign territory to show that the Federal
Circuit erred when it held that Ms. Atamirzayeva lacked standing to bring her
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim. First, this Comment will explore
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
Constitution generally. Next, this Comment will specifically examine the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the
various approaches courts have taken in its application. This Comment will
11. Paul A. LaFata, Note, Time to Overturn Tumey, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 335,
340-41 (2006).
12. See Ilana Tabacinic, Note, The Enemy-Property Doctrine: A Double Whammy?, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 601, 621 (2008).
13. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1328; Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 383
(Fed. Cl. 2007).
14. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008); Erin Creegan, The
Extraterritorial Constitutional Rights of Aliens in the Federal Circuit, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 273,
282-90 (2009).
15. See, e.g., Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[P]recedents clearly establish that in determining whether a taking exists where a foreign
government's actions are involved, the focus of the inquiry is the same as that undertaken in a
domestic taking case: the court must consider whether the United States' involvement was
sufficiently direct and substantial to warrant its responsibility under the fifth amendment.");
Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464; cf Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92
(1930) (holding that "alien friends are embraced within the terms of the Fifth Amendment" where
the alien and the property taken are located within the United States).
16. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 3 (describing Turney as a "landmark
decision" which has yet to be overruled en banc and, therefore is binding on the Federal Circuit).
17. See id. (describing Turney as a "landmark decision").
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analyze these approaches and show that the Federal Circuit's reliance upon the
substantial-connection test is unfounded and contradictory to precedent.
Finally, this Comment argues that courts must abandon the substantial-
connection test to eliminate the tension between recent developments and the
cases that precede its adoption. Specifically, this Comment will conclude that
the substantial-connection test contradicts the purpose of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and that courts must respect the property rights of friendly
aliens to the same degree as that of American citizens, regardless of where the
alien and the property are located.
I. A CLOSER LOOK AT INTERNATIONAL-TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, ratified in 1791,18 states: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 9 The
framers of the Constitution adopted this language "as a constraint on the
Government's power of eminent domain, defined as its power to force
transfers of property from owners to itself. '20 To effectively control such
power, the Takings Clause imposes on the government two distinct
requirements: (1) the property must be taken for a public use; and (2) the
government must pay just compensation to the owner. 21 Together, these two
18. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002, at 190 (2d ed. 2003). Unlike the other
provisions of the Fifth Amendment that deal with the rights of suspected criminals, the Takings
Clause states that the government cannot take private property for public use without providing
compensation to the property owners. Id. at 191. The Takings Clause was also the first provision
of the Fifth Amendment to be applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Courts have recognized the well-established principle that
"[e]very civilized State recognizes its obligation to make compensation for private property taken
under pressure of State necessity, and for the public good." Grant v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 41,
43 (Ct. Cl. 1863). Despite its simple language, the Takings Clause has produced convoluted and
esoteric Supreme Court precedent. See Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot
for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 1 (1989).
20. Jon A. Stanley, Comment, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory
Takings as Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 349, 353 (2001) (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 1102 (4th ed. 1998) (explaining the purpose and principles of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause). Although the rationale behind the Takings Clause "originated in
ancient Rome," it was the English concept of eminent domain that significantly influenced
American takings jurisprudence. See id. at 353-54. Originally, compensation for takings was not
commonplace, but legislation incrementally incorporated the notion of compensation, so that
most states required compensation for such takings by the time the Framers drafted the
Constitution. Id. at 354.
21. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)). In Kelo, the City of
New London, Connecticut, approved a development plan to revitalize the city's economy. Id. at
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conditions "ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards against
excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent domain
power."
22
Under the natural-rights theory, this clause is necessary because every
23person's right to hold property is inalienable . Thus, when the government
472. As part of the plan, the City purchased from private real estate owners most of the property
necessary for the project, but when negotiations with other property owners failed, the City
initiated condemnation proceedings. Id. at 475. In response, the hold-out owners brought a state-
court action asserting that the taking of their property would violate the "public use" requirement
of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause. Id. The trial court prohibited the City from taking
certain property, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld all of the proposed takings as
constitutionally valid. Id. at 476. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding
that the term "public use" is not defined as property that must be intended only for use by the
public, but "public use" simply requires that the taking serve a public purpose. Id. at 479-80.
The Court reasoned that because the City of New London approved the development plan to
promote the local economy and the public welfare, it served a public purpose. Id. at 483-84.
Additionally, the Court held that the City's determination that the area in question needed
economic revitalization was entitled to deference. Id. at 483.
Kelo is one of the most hated, but also most important, takings cases decided by the Supreme
Court. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1412, 1413 (2006); Associated Press, Homes May be 'Taken' for Private Projects,
MSNBC, June 23, 2005, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8331097/hs/us news. According to Bell and
Parchomovsky, libertarians hate Kelo because it grants "excessive deference to state actions that
impair private property rights." Bell & Parchomovsky, supra. They argue that Kelo invites the
government to take private property whenever it determines that the state has a better use for the
property. Id. Liberals also hate Kelo because it allows large corporations to receive from the
government the private property of individual owners without their consent, thus placing the
Court's "imprimatur ... on state victimization of the poorest property owners." Id Overall, Kelo
has become a "lightning rod" for criticism of government abuse of eminent domain. Id. at 1414.
The text of the Takings Clause does not indicate that the property taken must be located in the
United States, or that the clause is only applicable to citizens of the United States. EI-Shifa
Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Therefore, whether a
claimant is entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment is dependent upon the
"particular circumstances of each case." Tabacinic, supra note 12, at 604 (citing United States v.
Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
22. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. See Stanley, supra note 20, at 352 (stating that governmental takings undercut the
principles of individual rights). Natural-rights theory propounds that every person has certain
fundamental rights that cannot be surrendered. Id. English political theorist John Locke
contended that because private property has its foundation in natural law, which preceded the
creation of government, the primary purpose ofgovemment is to protect property rights. MELVIN
UROFSKY, RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS ch. 9
(2003), available at http://usinfo.org/zhtw/docsiRightsPeople/property.htm; see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 10 (1985)
(explaining Locke's view that individual natural rights are the "common gift of mankind" and
"are not derived from the sovereign"). According to John Locke:
The supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property without
his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and
that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the
people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that by
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takes a person's property without just compensation it "deprive[s] him of his
right, and ... abrogate[s] the laws of nature., 24 For this reason, when courts
adjudicate takings claims, they should respect this restraint on government
power. 25 To understand why the Takings Clause is applicable extraterritorially
to foreign nationals, it is important to first examine the rationale for extending
the Constitution's protections to foreign territories generally.
B. Extraterritoriality: The Constitution in Foreign Territories
When the states adopted the Fifth Amendment, the framers of the
Constitution took into consideration the United States' continuing expansion.
26
Traditionally, when discerning the reach of the Constitution, courts had to
consider whether constitutional limitations were relevant to government acts
overseas, and whether these limitations were applicable to acts performed in
U.S. territories that were not yet states.27  As the country expanded, the
entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an
absurdity for any man to own.
EPSTEIN, supra, at 14 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)).
Sir William Blackstone once stated: "[s]o great . . . is the regard of the law for private
property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 139.
Jon Stanley suggests that principles of human rights require greater emphasis on private-
property rights, regardless of state sovereignty. Stanley, supra note 20, at 389.
24. Stanley, supra note 20, at 352.
25. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253 (2008). Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution confers upon Congress the power to admit new states and to create all necessary
rules for U.S. territories:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall
be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States;
and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cls. 1-2. In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy provided a detailed
account of how the Constitution came to be applied extraterritorially. 128 S. Ct. at 2253-57. He
explained that questions of extraterritorial application were of little issue for most of U.S. history,
but "fundamental questions" arose when the United States "acquired noncontiguous Territories"
at the beginning of the twentieth century. Id. at 2253.
27. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 72 (1996). Because the boundaries of the Constitution have been
pushed outward throughout history, the evolution of its extraterritorial application can be
analogized to a series of"concentric circles": (I) U.S. "citizens living within the [United] States";
(2) "aliens living within the United States"; (3) territories acquired by the United States; (4)
territories where the United States exercised significant, but not sovereign, control and authority;
and (5) citizens in foreign territories acting against the United States. Elizabeth A. Wilson, The
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Supreme Court viewed the Constitution as "a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, [that] covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances. ' ' 28 Furthermore, the Court has
held that the Constitution is applicable to the U.S. government any time and at
any place it exercises its power.29 Thus, when the United States acts outside ofits territorial boundaries, its power is not limitless.30
1. Mutuality of Obligation
One theory that assists in understanding why the Constitution is applied
31extraterritorially is the concept of mutuality of obligation. Inherent in the
theory of mutuality is the notion that constitutional rights and obedience to
32American law are intertwined. In other words, the Constitution and its
provisions are applicable to those who are required to obey the laws of the
United States. Moreover, if the United States expects other countries to
War on Terrorism and "The Water's Edge": Sovereignty, "Territorial Jurisdiction, " and the
Reach of the US. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165,
189-93 (2006).
28. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
29. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) ("The Constitution of the
United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that
government is exerted."); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285-86
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing the idea that the Constitution applies to federal action
abroad, including acts toward foreign nationals). Accordingly, many academics argue for the
internationalization of the Constitution to serve as an external check on the United States because,
in their view, the United States is often a bad actor when it acts abroad. LaFata, supra note 11, at
363. Arguments that the Constitution should be internationalized are grounded in natural-rights
theory, or in the theory that the government is universally bound by the Constitution. Id. at 364;
see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885));
Wilson, supra note 27, at 180 (discussing the two dissents in Verdugo-Urquidez and explaining
Justice Brennan's view). Gerald Neuman states that the "legacy of the Alien Act debates includes
the fundamental rejection of the claim that citizenship is the key to rights-bearing capacity under
the Constitution. Moreover, not even the Insular Cases relied on a distinction between the rights
of American citizens and the rights of subject peoples in the territories." Neuman, supra note 27,
at 103. Thus, the U.S. government must act according to the Constitution at all times, even when
acting upon aliens.
31. Neuman, supra note 27, at 98.
32. Id. According to Justice Brennan's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, "[m]utuality is
essential to ensure the fundamental fairness that underlies our Bill of Rights." Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prior to this statement, Justice Brennan quoted James
Madison, stating, "[alliens are not more parties to the laws than they are parties to the
Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience,
they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage." Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON,
REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556 (2d ed. 1836)).
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respect the rights of its citizens, then in turn, the United States must respect the
rights of the citizens of those other countries.
33
Justice Hugo Black's opinion for a plurality of the Court in Reid v. Covert
explained the importance of mutuality and resurrected mutuality as a basis for
determining the scope of the Constitution's application. Reid involved the
habeas corpus proceedings of two women who were tried by military
authorities for murdering their husbands, both of whom were military officers,
while they were stationed at foreign bases.34  Although Reid included two
American citizens abroad, and is distinct from Atamirzayeva in that respect, it
is significant because it re-established the concept of mutuality and abolished
the strict territorial approach previously embraced by the Supreme Court.
35
In his plurality opinion in Reid, Justice Black rejected the notion that the
United States can disregard the Bill of Rights when it acts against its citizens
overseas, explicitly stating that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution," and that "[i]ts power and authority have no other source." 36
Justice Black examined the language of Article 1II, Section 2 of the
Constitution and concluded that it was designed, in part, to control the
government, even when it acts outside of the boundaries of the United States.
37
33. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When the United
States enforces its laws in foreign territories without the safeguards of the Constitution, it
encourages other nations to treat U.S. citizens living abroad with less respect than they treat their
own citizens. Id.; LaFata, supra note 11, at 348.
34. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1957).
35. Neuman, supra note 27, at 89. The strict territorial approach, formerly the dominant
approach throughout most of U.S. history, states that the reach of the Constitution extends no
further than the "the water's edge" of U.S. sovereign territory. Wilson, supra note 27, at 168.
For example, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court invoked the strict
territorial approach stating that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it
have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens." United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). This approach is based upon the notion
that each state occupies a certain area on earth, and only that state can exercise jurisdiction over
that land's people and property. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909). This approach is derived from the international law "principle of territoriality." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1) cmt. c.
(1987). In addition to public international law, the presumption of territoriality in the United
States was derived from the belief that Congress was not concerned with international matters.
See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). However, the modern globalization of
economic, political, and social issues belies the traditional presumption of territoriality. See Brief
for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 3-4, 17-18, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (Nos. 89-1838, 89-1845).
An example of the abandonment of strict territoriality is found in the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, which replaced the strict territoriality approach for prescribing
jurisdiction with a "reasonableness" approach. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS:
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) (Introductory Note). The Restatement explains that
"[t]erritoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to prescribe, but in
determining their meaning rigid concepts have been replaced by broader criteria." Id.
36. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
37. Id. at 7.
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Justice Black distinguished cases such as In re Ross
38 and the Insular Cases39
in concluding that the respondents had to be released from custody because
court-martial jurisdiction cannot be constitutionally applied to trials of civilian
dependents of military members.40
When the parties originally argued Reid before the Court, the majority found
that the military trials of the respondents were constitutional.4' In that opinion,
the majority relied on Ross in holding that Article III, Section 2 and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments did not apply abroad.42  However, after the Court
granted the petition for rehearing, Justice Black stated that Ross "is one of
those cases that cannot be understood except in its peculiar setting; even then,
it seems highly unlikely that a similar result would be reached today." 43 More
importantly, Justice Black repudiated the Court's assertion in Ross that the
Constitution had no effect abroad and noted that many cases have since
resisted this approach as flawed.44
The Insular Cases, on the other hand, involved newly acquired and
culturally different U.S. territories.45 Unlike Ross, the plurality in the Insular
38. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
39. E.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
40. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 40-41 (plurality opinion). Justice Black distinguished military
tribunals and the trials of civilians in federal courts by pointing to the differences in values and
attitudes between military and civilian society. Id. at 39 ("In the military, by necessity, emphasis
must be placed on the security and order of the group rather than on the value and integrity of the
individual."). Justice Black rejected the government's argument that the expansion of military
jurisdiction over the civilians at issue was slight, while the practical necessity was great, stating
that "[s]light encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new
territory to capture" and further noting that the encroachment in Reid was not slight. Id. at 39-40.
41. Id. at5.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. The plaintiff in Ross was a British subject, enlisted as an American seaman on an
American ship, who was tried and convicted before a U.S. consular court in Japan for murdering
an officer on the ship while it was in Japanese waters. Ross, 140 U.S. at 454-55, 458. Statutes at
the time authorized American consuls to try American citizens who were accused of committing
crimes in Japan and other "non-Christian" countries. Reid, 354 U.S. at 10. According to Justice
Black, this consular power was "extreme and absolute." Id. at 11. Although Ross's conviction
was upheld under U.S. statutes, the Court declared that the Constitution did not apply abroad. Id.
at 12.
44. Reid, 354 U.S. at 12.
45. Id. at 13. Because the territories involved in the Insular Cases had been acquired by the
United States, they were governed by Congress pursuant to Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution. Id. The Supreme Court, in the Insular Cases, held that certain constitutional
provisions did not apply to these territories because "they had not been 'expressly or impliedly
incorporated' in the Union by Congress." Id.; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
While the Court noted that fundamental constitutional rights apply everywhere, it found that it
would be inefficient to require a jury trial in the insular territories. Reid, 354 U.S. at 13 (plurality
opinion).
The most notable of the Insular Cases is Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE
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Cases held that although fundamental constitutional rights were applicable to
these territories, certain constitutional guarantees did not apply to them
because Congress had not incorporated them into the Union. However,
Justice Black writing for a plurality of the Court in Reid, stated that the Court's
initial reliance on the Insular Cases was "misplaced. 47  Justice Black duly
noted that the Insular Cases dealt with Congress's power to regulate territories
80 (2006). The importance of Downes is that it "brought the constitutional question of
congressional authority into sharp relief." Id. In Downes, the Court had to differentiate between
domestic and foreign products shipped into the United States from one of its territories for
purposes of the Dingley Tariff, which regulated the duties for all articles imported from foreign
countries. Id. Downes involved a claim by a New York merchant for the recovery of the duties
that he paid on oranges he received from the newly acquired territory of Puerto Rico. Downes,
182 U.S. at 247. The Foraker Act, also known as the Organic Act of 1900, established for Puerto
Rico a civil government, including a governor, an executive council, a House of Representatives,
a judicial system, and a non-voting Resident Commissioner in Congress. Foraker Act, ch. 1919,
33 Stat. 77, 81-85 (1900); Foraker Act (Organic Act of 1900), http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/
1898/foraker.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). Ultimately, the Court reached its conclusion based
on the consequence of its holding: if Congress could tax the oranges in Downes, Puerto Rico
would be considered a foreign country, otherwise, Puerto Rico would be considered part of the
United States and the Foraker Act would have to be struck down as unconstitutional. SPARROW,
supra, at 86. The Court split five to four in favor of Congress's power to impose the duties and
issued five separate opinions. Id. at 87. The majority held that while Puerto Rico was a territory
that belonged to the United States, it was "not a part of the United States within the revenue
clauses of the Constitution," and therefore declared the Foraker Act constitutionally valid.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Edward Douglass White did not focus on the applicability of
the Constitution as a whole, but rather on which particular constitutional provisions were
effective in territories such as Puerto Rico. Id. at 342-43 (White, J., concurring). Specifically,
Justice White stated that "the determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is
applicable, generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory
and its relations to the United States." Id. at 293.
46. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion). The Territorial Incorporation Doctrine
distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated territories. Alan Tauber, The Empire
Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
147, 158 (2006). "An incorporated territory is one destined to become a state from the time of its
acquisition." 86 C.J.S. Territories § 4 (2008). "A territory may become incorporated only
through the express or implied consent of Congress, and once incorporated, the federal
constitution fully applies to it." Id. Justice White's concurring opinion in Downes is often
credited with the creation of this doctrine. Tauber, supra, at 158. Justice White relied on the
Treaty of Paris to conclude that Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico. Downes, 182
U.S. at 339-40 (White, J., concurring). More importantly, he stated that while Puerto Rico was
not foreign in the sense that it was owned by the United States and thus subject to its sovereignty,
it was foreign in a domestic sense because Congress never incorporated it. Id. at 341-42; Tabor,
supra, at 162-63.
Dorr v. United States, another Insular Case that involved the right to a jury trial, was also
important because "it was the first time the Court addressed the application of the Bill of Rights
to the territories of the United States," and held that procedural rights do not extend to
unincorporated territories. Tabor, supra, at 163 (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143
(1904)). Further, in the last Insular Case, Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court adopted the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine. Id.
47. Reid, 354 U.S. at 13-14.
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with dissimilar customs and traditions, while Reid addressed the basis for the
government's power to try U.S. civilians in military trials.48 By establishing
that the Bill of Rights follows every citizen regardless of his location, Justice
Black reinvigorated the concept of mutuality as a basis for determining the
scope of the Constitution's application.
49
Therefore, the theory of mutuality requires that two factors must be taken
into account when determining which constitutional provisions apply in
specific circumstances: (1) the status of the territory; and (2) the specific power
the United States attempts to exercise.50  Under mutuality, "both aliens and
citizens living in unincorporated territories are entitled to the same (reduced)
constitutional protection."
5 1
2. Practical Considerations in Applying the Constitution Abroad
The feasibility and consequences of applying the Constitution abroad have
also been important considerations when determining whether particular
constitutional provisions apply abroad. In Boumediene v. Bush, for example,
the Supreme Court held that the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus
applied to alien enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 2 To
reach this monumental decision, the Court analyzed numerous cases that
established the geographic scope of constitutional guarantees. 53 In particular,
the Court discussed the practical considerations that influenced the Court's
analysis of the Constitution's limits in the Insular Cases, Reid, and Johnson v.
Eisentrager.
54
The Insular Cases Court held that certain provisions of the Constitution
were applicable to unincorporated territories, but also expressed its reluctance
to implement a rule that abrogated the existing legal systems in newly acquired
territories out of fear of causing instability. 55 This concern led to the doctrine
48. Id.
49. See id at 5-6.
50. See Wilson, supra note 27, at 185 (explaining that although the mutuality approach
could be interpreted as a bright-line rule, courts typically apply it in the context of balancing "the
status of the territory and the particular power being applied").
51. Id. (emphasis added). Wilson further argues that although the Supreme Court has
traditionally applied the mutuality-of-obligation approach to sovereign territories of the United
States, the rationale of this approach would allow courts to apply it extraterritorially. Id at 186.
52. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
53. Id. at 2253-59; see also, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 18-20; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 784-85 (1950); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922); Downes v. Birdwell,
182 U.S. 244, 286-87 (1901); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
54. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256-57.
55. Id. at 2254 (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at 282). One such consideration pertained to the
type of legal system adopted by former Spanish colonies. Id. These colonies were governed by a
civil-law system, whereas the states were under a common-law system. Id. The Court noted that
its holding in the Insular Cases had the possibility of substantially disrupting civil-law territories
by imposing on them the U.S. common law. Id. Additionally, such a change would have been
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of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution is fully applicable to
incorporated territories but only applies in part to unincorporated territories.
56
Thus, according to the Boumediene Court, the practical difficulties associated
with applying the Constitution at all times to all areas led the Court to develop
a system under which the power of the Constitution would be used "sparingly
and where it would be most needed."57
While the petitioners' citizenship was an essential aspect of Reid, "practical
considerations, related . . . to the place of their confinement and trial, were
relevant to each member of the Reid majority." 58 Specifically, Justice John
Marshall Harlan II's and Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinions in
Reid distinguished the case from Ross based on "practical considerations."
59
In other words, a jury trial was more feasible for the petitioners in Reid than it
was for the petitioner in Ross.
60
Finally, the Boumediene Court analyzed the practical considerations
contemplated in Eisentrager.6 1 The Eisentrager Court, in its determination
that the writ of habeas corpus did not apply to enemy prisoners held and tried
by the U.S. Army abroad, noted the practical difficulties in granting the writ.
62
Such considerations included Army transportation for the prisoners and their
witnesses overseas, security, and living expenses.63  Furthermore, the Court
held that granting the requested "trials would hamper the war effort and bring
aid and comfort to the enemy. ' 64 By considering these practical aspects, "the
unnecessary because the United States intended to grant independence to certain colonies, such as
the Philippines. Id.
56. Id.; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.
58. Id at 2256.
59. Id at 2257.
60. Id According to Justice Harlan, "Ross and the Insular Cases hold.., that the particular
local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of
judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of
Congress' [sic] power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Ross, the citizenship of the British subject convicted by
the American consular court in Japan, see supra note 43, was not determinate in the Court's
holding that the Constitution did not apply to him. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464, 479 (1891). In
fact, the Court treated him as if he was an American citizen that violated U.S. law because it was
the "simplest rule" to do so. Id. at 479. This consideration led the concurring Justices in Reid to
distinguish Ross from other cases on the basis of practicality. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2257.
61. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257. Eisentrager addressed the habeas corpus claims of
German enemy aliens held in the custody of the U.S. Army in China who were convicted by a
military commission for violating the laws of war. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66
(1950).
62. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779; see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
63. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
64. Id.
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Court sought to balance the constraints of military occupation with
constitutional necessities.
'
"
65
3. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: The Substantial-Connection Test
Ignoring these previous considerations, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, and the Federal Circuit agreed in Atamirzayeva,
that the Constitution does not apply to a foreign national, unless he has a
substantial voluntary connection to the United States.66 However, the Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez established this substantial-connection test in determining
the reach of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. 67 The respondent in Verdugo-Urquidez was a Mexican citizen and
resident, assumed to be involved in a drug-smuggling organization. 68 After the
U.S. government obtained an arrest warrant, local Mexican police apprehended
the respondent and sent him to the United States, where he was formally
arrested. 69  After his arrest, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents seized incriminating evidence during searches of the respondent's
Mexican residences.
70
Verdugo-Urquidez, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, filed a motion to
71
suppress the evidence seized during the searches. Citing Reid and relying on
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,72 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
granting the motion to suppress.7 3 However, the Supreme Court reversed and
65. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257.
66. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); Atamirzayeva v. United
States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1321-22, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
67. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
68. Id at 262.
69. Id
70. Id. at 262-63. A DEA agent requested the searches because he believed that they would
provide evidence of the respondent's narcotics trafficking activities, as well as his involvement in
the kidnapping and murder of a DEA Special Agent. Id. at 262. A search of one of the
respondent's residences revealed a tally sheet that the government believed was a record of
marijuana smuggled into the United States. Id. at 262-63.
71. See id. at 263. The Fourth Amendment states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
73. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Court's holding in
Reid that American citizens tried by military authorities abroad are entitled to the safeguards of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in reaching its conclusion that the federal government is
constrained by the Constitution when it acts abroad. Id. Additionally, because the majority in
Lopez-Mendoza found that illegal aliens in the United States are entitled to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit determined that the respondent was entitled to the same
protections. Id. In particular, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]t would be odd indeed to
acknowledge that Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the fifth amendment, and to
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held that, because Verdugo-Urquidez "had no previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States," he did not develop a substantial connection
with the United States and, therefore, had no Fourth Amendment rights.74
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, based the rationale
behind this substantial-connection test, in part, upon the language of the Fourth
Amendment.75  He found that the phrase "the people" in the Fourth
Amendment "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community." 76  Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that Verdugo-Urquidez's involuntary presence in the United States
at the time of the search was insufficient to establish a substantial connection
to the United States, thus excluding him from "the people" to whom the Fourth
Amendment applies.77  In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
distinguished Lopez-Mendoza on the basis that the illegal aliens in Lopez-
Mendoza "were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted
some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with
a fair trial under the sixth amendment, . . . and deny him the protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded under the fourth amendment." United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the Lopez-Mendoza decision was
limited to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule in civil deportations and not dispositive of
whether the Fourth Amendment would apply to all illegal aliens in the United States. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
74. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. This holding marked the end of the "post-Reid
phase of expansion in the extraterritorial application of the Constitution." Wilson, supra note 27,
at 188-89.
75. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
76. Id. This approach is known as the "membership" approach, as distinguished from the
"mutuality of obligation" approach, discussed above. Wilson, supra note 27, at 182; supra Part
I.B.I. These two approaches are fundamentally distinct because "the 'membership' approach
looks for indicia of belonging, such as citizenship and sovereignty, whereas the 'mutuality of
obligation' approach sees control or jurisdiction as a trigger of rights necessary to temper
authority within the rule of law." Wilson, supra note 27, at 182. The membership approach
applies the Constitution to an exclusive class of persons who belong to the "club." Id. at 184.
These "members" have a special relationship with the Constitution due to their status or the
location of where they live. Id.
Conversely, Justice Anthony Kennedy disregards the reference to "the people" in the Fourth
Amendment and, instead, focuses his analysis on the reasoning in Reid, Ross, and the Insular
Cases to reach the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment's protections do not extend to
Verdugo-Urquidez. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
supra Part I.B.1. Under Justice Kennedy's interpretation of these cases, the reach of the
constitutional protections is limited by considerations of the U.S. power and authority to act
abroad. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This approach
provides that "rights flow to individuals as the necessary correlates of the government's exercise
of political or legal power over them." Wilson, supra note 27, at 184.
77. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
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this country that might place him among 'the people' of the United States. 78
Therefore, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to
Verdugo-Urquidez.79
C. The Takings Clause on an International Level
After considering the extraterritorial application of the Constitution
generally, and the underlying rationale for this application, the next question
pertains to the particular constitutional provision at issue; specifically, whether
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies to foreign citizens abroad.80 In
general, takings claims involving American-owned property located in a
foreign territory and alien-owned property located in the United States are
valid, but the constitutional validity of claims involving alien-owned property
located in a foreign territory have been the subject of much debate. 81
1. When Is the United States Liable for an International Taking?
Wiggins v. United States, which involved the property of an American
citizen, was one of the first cases to address the issue of international takings
by the U.S. government. In Wiggins, the Court of Claims found that a
compensable taking occurred when a U.S. naval commander destroyed gun
powder owned by U.S. citizens and stored in Costa Rica for sale to
Nicaragua.
8 3
Several years later in Turney v. United States, a case relied on by Ms.
Atamirzayeva, 84 the Court of Claims upheld a claim for just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment with respect to property held abroad and,
therefore, found that the Takings Clause applied extraterritorially. 85 Turney
involved the U.S. government's taking of classified military radar equipment
that was purchased at a surplus sale and located in the Philippines. 86 Neither
78. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist made this distinction assuming, but not holding, that the
Fourth Amendment is applicable to illegal aliens within the United States. Id at 272-73; see
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273-74.
80. See id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957).
81. See Tabicinic, supra note 12, at 620-21.
82. See Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 412, 420-22 (Ct. Cl. 1867).
83. Id. at 413-14, 421-22. In a similar case, in which a private citizen asserted a trespass
claim against a military officer, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney stated: "Where the owner has done
nothing to forfeit his [property] rights, every public officer is bound to respect them, whether he
finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in his own." Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 115, 128, 133 (1851).
84. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 380 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
85. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
86. Id. at 458-60. The Leyte Air Depot, where the radar equipment in question was located,
was established to support American forces in their efforts to free the Philippines from Japanese
occupation. Id at 458. Upon the release of the Philippines at the end of World War II, the
United States enacted the Philippine Rehabilitation Act on April 30, 1946, which authorized the
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party to the sale was aware that it included classified military radar
equipment. Upon learning this, the U.S. Air Force offered to trade
commercial communications equipment for the military radar equipment, but
the buyers refused. 88 After rejecting a counter-offer, the Commanding General
of the Fourth Air Depot told the plaintiff that the United States was going to
repossess the radar equipment, either by negotiation or by force with the
assistance of the Philippine government.
8 9
The buyers notified the U.S. government that any attempted seizure would
be resisted.90 In response, the President of the Philippines, in cooperation with
the United States, placed an embargo on the exportation of equipment stored at
the Leyte Air Depot.91 The Philippine government subsequently lifted the
embargo when the buyers gave the U.S. government written assurance that the
radar equipment would be segregated from the other Leyte Air Depot surplus
property. Upon segregating the radar equipment, the buyers entered into a
written agreement with the U.S. government, pursuant to which the buyers
would return the radar equipment to the U.S. government in exchange for a
written receipt for the equipment and the right "to make a claim against the
U.S. Government for losses in connection with the equipment."
93
The Court of Claims ultimately determined that the repossession was a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.94  In reaching this
conclusion, the court considered the close relationship between the United
U.S. government to transfer surplus property located in the Philippines to the Philippine
government. Id. Pursuant to the Act, the Leyte Air Depot was transferred to the Philippine
government, and some of the property stored at the depot was sold at a surplus sale. Id. The
buyers, Americans Paul B. Ranslow and Vernon E. Childers, both World War II veterans, ran an
export-import business in China. Id. at 458. While in the Philippines, Ranslow learned of the
Leyte Air Depot surplus sale, and he asked Childers to contact potential investors to help them
place a bid for the property. Id. Their first bid was rejected, but their second bid was accepted
and they entered into a contract for the property. Id. at 459. Soon thereafter, Ranlsow, Childers,
and their investors decided to form a corporation under the laws of the Philippines to hold the
property. Id. On October 30, 1947, the corporation's stockholders decided to liquidate the
corporation, and they designated Edward Turney as the liquidating trustee. Id. at 460-61. As
liquidating trustee, Turney was authorized to "[t]o prosecute and defend any and all suits, actions,
and other proceedings in the Courts, tribunals, departments and offices of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines." Id. at 461.
87. Id. at 459.
88. Id.
89. Id. The U.S. government's use of the Philippine government to repossess the radar
equipment did not affect the court's analysis. Id. Specifically, it stated "[tihat aid would have
been necessary because the materials were located on soil under the sovereignty of the Philippine
government." Id.
90. Id. at 460.
91. Id.
92. Id. Later, an agreement was made that an Army member would be designated as an
agent of the Philippine government in supervising such segregation. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 463-64.
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States and the Philippines, including the recent liberation of the Philippines
from Japanese occupation, the gift of millions of dollars in equipment at the
Leyte Air Depot, and the Philippine government's cooperation in helping the
United States recover its radar equipment.95 Because the Philippine-imposed
embargo "put irresistible pressure upon the corporation to come to terms with
the U.S. Army," 96 the court rejected the government's argument that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause is inapplicable in foreign countries.97
Two years later in Seery v. United States, the Court of Claims, citing Turney,
again rejected the government's argument that the Takings Clause is
inapplicable in foreign countries. 98 In fact, the Court of Claims specifically
relied on Turney to support its conclusion that although there was little case
law regarding the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment, the
Takings Clause applies extraterritorially when it may be applied "without
inconvenience. ' '99  Thus, the court viewed practical considerations as
dispositive in determining whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
applies abroad. 100
Three years later, in Langenegger v. United States, the Federal Circuit held
that foreign takings claims were justiciable and established a test for foreign
takings, ultimately concluding that the plaintiff failed to allege a compensable
taking. 10 1 The test applied by the Federal Circuit focused not on the acts of all
95. Id. at 463.
96. Id. at 463-64.
97. Id. at 464. The court determined that although some constitutional provisions cannot be
applied extraterritorially, that does not dictate that the Takings Clause is automatically excluded
from extraterritorial application. Id.
98. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 603 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (citing Turney, 115 F.
Supp. at 215). The Seery plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen, owned property in Austria that the
U.S. Army seized and converted into an officers' club. Id. at 602-03. When the plaintiff
returned to her property, "she found that the real property had been greatly damaged and
practically all of the personal property had disappeared." Id. at 603. As a result, she filed a claim
that the United States took her property for public use without just compensation. Id
99. Id. Acknowledging that the court had previously noted in Turney that there were no
precedents directly addressing the issue, the court explained that
it seemed to us that, since the Constitutional provision could be applied, without
inconvenience, to such a situation, it ought to be so applied. In the Tumey case the
plaintiff was an alien corporation, whereas the instant plaintiff is an American citizen.
If that fact is material, it is to her advantage.
Id. (citation omitted).
100. See id; see also supra Part I.B.2.
101. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Court
of Claims held that Langenegger was nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine, but
the Federal Circuit disagreed and explained that "[c]onsideration of land taking claims is clearly
the role of the judiciary according to the Constitution, Amendment V, and ascertainment of 'just
compensation' is a judicial function." Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569; Langenegger v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct. 229, 235-36 (Cl. Ct. 1984). The political-question doctrine was established in
the case of Marbury v. Madison, when Chief Justice John Marshall stated that "[q]uestions, in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can
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parties involved, but rather turned on whether the United States was directly
and substantially involved in the alleged taking to trigger Fifth Amendment
protections. 102  When, as in Atamirzayeva, the United States and another
sovereign have both acted to effectuate an alleged taking of private property
under the Fifth Amendment, the Federal Circuit provided two factors for
determining whether the United States' involvement was sufficiently direct and
substantial to require just compensation: (1) "the nature of the United States'
activity," and (2) "the level of the benefit the United States has derived."10 3
2. "Friendly Aliens"
The status of the foreign national who brings a Fifth Amendment takings
claim against the United States is a dispositive factor.104 Specifically, under
the "enemy property doctrine," the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does
not apply to enemy aliens. 10 5 However, it does protect friendly aliens against
never be made in this court." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). There are two types
of cases that courts decline to adjudicate under the political-question doctrine: (1) cases that are
exclusively reviewable by the political branches, and (2) cases that should be left to the discretion
of the political branches "as a matter of prudence." KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (16th ed. 2007). Therefore, courts cannot intervene in
political issues that only the political branches are entitled to decide under the Constitution, and
courts should not intervene in political issues that the other branches of government are better
able to resolve. 1d.
In Baker v. Carr, Justice William Brennan reformulated the political-question doctrine and
proposed a six-part test, consistent with Justice Thurgood Marshall's approach, to determine
whether a matter is a nonjusticiable political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
102. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72 ("[I1n determining whether a taking exists where a
foreign government's actions are involved, the focus of the inquiry is the same as that undertaken
in a domestic taking case: the court must consider whether the United States' involvement was
sufficiently direct and substantial to warrant its responsibility under the fifth amendment.").
103. Id. at 1572. The court also differentiated between "'friendly' persuasion regarding
general policy" by a country, and an actual taking. Id. In particular, the Court stated that it would
not hold the United States liable for a foreign sovereign's expropriation when the United States
simply recommended the action, as is a common practice between friendly allies. Id.
Additionally, the United States is not responsible for such a taking because the only benefit it
derives is the political stability of neighboring countries. Id.
104. See EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105. See id. ("[T]he United States does not have to answer under the Takings Clause for the
destruction of enemy property."); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property,
and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 963, 986 (2007). The "enemy property
[Vol. 59:559
2010] Why Atamirzayeva v. United States Was Decided Incorrectly 577
takings of private property by the United States without just compensation, in
the same way it protects U.S. citizens, regardless of whether the property is
located in the United States or abroad.
10 6
The Takings Clause's extension to friendly aliens was established by the
Supreme Court in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States. 0 7 In Russian
Volunteer Fleet, the U.S. government, through the U.S. Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 0 8 requisitioned contracts for building ships, and
ships already under construction, from a Russian corporation, which then sued
the U.S. government for just compensation. 109 The Supreme Court identified
the Russian corporation as "an alien friend" that "was entitled to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment."110 The Court further held that because the United
States exercised its "power of eminent domain in taking the [Russian
corporation's] property, the United States became bound to pay just
compensation."
Similarly, in Seery, the Court of Claims rejected the government's argument
that the property of a U.S. citizen located in a foreign territory was enemy
property and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
because the property "was not a product of enemy soil," nor considered
"hostile property" even though the court assumed that Austria-where the
doctrine" is derived from the military-necessity doctrine and the alien-enemy-disability rule.
Vladeck, supra, at 987. The military-necessity doctrine provides that a government may take or
destroy property to "prevent it from falling into enemy hands," to "protect the state or its
citizens," or to secure the ends of war. Tabacinic, supra note 12, at 606. Similarly, the alien-
enemy-disability rule provides that the Takings Clause does not protect the property interests of
aliens serving a country at war with the United States. Id. at 615.
106. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489-91 (1931).
107. Id.
108. In an effort to remedy the "severe shortage of ocean-shipping services" caused by World
War I, Congress enacted the Shipping Act of 1916, which was signed into law on September 7,
1916. Robert Higgs, How the Federal Government Got into the Ocean-Shipping Business, TiE
FREEMAN, Nov. 1, 2003, http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1233. The
Shipping Act "created the U.S. Shipping Board, and empowered it to regulate the rates and
practices of waterborne common carriers in foreign and interstate commerce." Id The U.S.
Shipping Board also had the power, through the Emergency Fleet Corporation, to acquire, build,
own, and operate merchant vessels for the U.S. government. Id.
109. Russian Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. at 486-87.
110. Id. at 489.
111. Id. The Court explained:
As alien friends are embraced within the terms of the Fifth Amendment, it cannot be
said that their property is subject to confiscation here because the property of our
citizens may be confiscated in the alien's country. The provision that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation establishes a standard for
our Government which the Constitution does not make dependent upon the standards of
other governments.
Id. at 491-92.
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property was located-was "enemy territo,7 ."112 The court also noted that theplaintiff did not reside in enemy territory.
3. The Substantial-Connection Test and the International Application of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
Although Verdugo-Urquidez established the substantial-connection test
relied upon by the Federal Circuit in Atamirzayeva,114 not all courts have been
willing to apply this test, particularly in the context of international takings.
1 15
In El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, the appellant, a
Sudanese corporation, sued for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment
after the U.S. military destroyed its manufacturing facility in Sudan during
operations that President Clinton deemed necessary to prevent an imminent
terrorist attack against the United States.H 6 The U.S. government moved to
dismiss the takings claim on the grounds that, among other things, EI-Shifa
lacked standing because the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does not apply
to foreign nationals who lack a substantial and voluntary connection to the
United States. 117 The Court of Federal Claims rejected this argument, instead
relying on Turney to conclude that EI-Shifa had standing to sue the United
States.1 18  However, the Court of Federal Claims ultimately granted the
government's motion to dismiss on the merits, holding that "the right to
compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment does not extend to the
destruction of property designated by the President as enemy war-making
property.",119 The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the appellant's takings
claim presented a nonjusticiable political question and not a standing issue as
in Atamirzayeva.120 This holding required the Federal Circuit in El-Shifa "to
reach the reviewability of the takings claim, rather than hold[] that no such
112. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 605 (Ct. Cl. 1955); see also Vladeck, supra
note 105, at 986.
113. Seery, 127 F. Supp. at 605.
114. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see supra Part
I.B.3.
115. See, e.g., EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
116. Id. at 1348-49. The United States destroyed EI-Shifa's manufacturing facility because
it was believed that the facility was being used by Osama bin Laden to produce the ingredients for
nerve gas. Id. at 1349.
117. Id. at 1349-50.
118. EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 763--64 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
119. Id at771,774.
120. EI-Shifa, 378 F.3d at 1352, 1354-55, 1370 ("[W]e decline to hold, as the government
asks, that the Takings Clause does not protect the interests of nonresident aliens whose property is
located in a foreign country unless they can demonstrate substantial voluntary connections to the
United States."). Specifically, the court held that the appellant was precluded from seeking
judicial review of President Bill Clinton's designation of their plant as enemy property. Id. at
1365.
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claim was protected by the Takings Clause."' 21 In affirming the Court of
Claims' holding of lack of standing, the Federal Circuit emphasized that absent
an overruling case, it was bound by the holding in Turney that the Takings
Clause applies to non-American citizens.
1 22
The Federal Circuit's decision to follow Turney, and reject the substantial
and voluntary connection test laid out in Verdugo-Urquidez, is consistent with
the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Although
not an international takings case, Boumediene, which the Supreme Court
decided eighteen years after Verdugo-Urquidez, did not mention a substantial-
connection test and explicitly rejected a rigid rule for determining the
extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution, stating that "questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism." 123  These statements in Boumediene seem incongruous with
Verdugo-Urquidez; while Verdugo-Urquidez establishes a bright-line rule for
the extraterritorial application of constitutional provisions, the Court in
Boumediene rejected such formal requirements in favor of other prudential
considerations.!24
4. The International Application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
Today: Atamirzayeva
The precedents discussed above, though relevant to resolving Ms.
Atamirzayeva's Fifth Amendment takings claim, do not fully resolve the issue.
Ms. Atamirzayeva sought compensation for the destruction of her cafeteria at
the U.S. government's request. 125  However, the Court of Federal Claims
rejected her claim, ignoring practical considerations in favor of the rigidS ,126
substantial-connection test. Ms. Atamirzayeva then appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which affirmed, also relying on the substantial-connection test.
27
Thus, Ms. Atamirzayeva was never compensated for the United States' seizure
of her property, notwithstanding Supreme Court precedent indicating that she
was entitled to relief.
128
121. Vladeck, supra note 105, at 991.
122. EI-Shifa, 378 F.3d at 1351-52. Although the continuing validity of Turney has been
questioned in light of Verdugo-Urquidez, the Federal Circuit concluded that it was bound by
principles of stare decisis to follow Turney. Id. at 1352.
123. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258 (2008) (describing the common thread
between the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid). The Court further stated that "[t]he test for
determining the scope of [a constitutional] provision must not be subject to manipulation by those
whose power it is designed to restrain." Id. at 2259. The Court also rejected the argument that
"the Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends" with respect to foreign
nationals. Id. at 2253.
124. See supra notes 65 & 74 and accompanying text.
125. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 379 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
126. Id. at387.
127. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
128. See supra Part I.C. 1.
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II. GOING IN A NEW DIRECTION
A. The U.S. Constitution: To Infinity and Beyond
Precedent clearly provides that the U.S. Constitution applies
extraterritorially.129  However, application of the Constitution to foreign
nationals "requires a fusion of 'one line of Supreme Court cases establishing
that American citizens have constitutional rights abroad with another line
holding that aliens in the United States are entitled to constitutional
safeguards." ' 130 As discussed above, courts prefer a practical, function-based
approach to ascertaining the Constitution's extraterritorial reach rather than a
"rigid and abstract" rule.131  However, the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez
adopted, and the government in Boumediene advocated, a formalistic approach
to the application of constitutional provisions abroad.132 While the government
in Boumediene attempted to advance its position that Eisentrager promoted the
adoption of a formalistic test for determining the reach of the Suspension
Clause,133 the Court rejected this approach and explained that if it were to
accept the government's argument, it would represent a "complete
repudiation" of the functional approach used in the Insular Cases and Reid,
and it would overlook the fact that all three cases express the idea that
extraterritoriality should rely on practicality rather than formalism-requiring
a provision-by-provision analysis of extraterritorial constitutional
application.'
34
B. Foreign National, Foreign Property, Domestic Constitutional Provision
Because it is well-settled that the Constitution, and specifically the Fifth
Amendment, applies beyond the United States' borders, courts have begun to
focus their inquiry on what constitutes a compensable taking when the alleged
taking occurs abroad and on who may bring such a claim.135 The purpose of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is to limit the government's power and
129. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (stating that when the United States acts
outside of its borders, it is still subject to the provisions of the Constitution); see also supra Part
l.B.
130. Remsen M. Kinne IV, Making America Pay: Just Compensation for Foreign Property
Takings, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 217, 227 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856
F.2d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
131. See supra Parts I.B.2, !.C.3.
132. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66, 274-75.
133. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58. The Suspension Clause states: "The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
134. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
135. Kinne, supra note 130, at 221-22 (proposing that courts no longer question the
applicability of the Takings Clause abroad since Reid).
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protect an individual's inalienable right to own property. 36 A determination of
whether the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the United States that is based
on a person's citizenship and location is incompatible with the clause's
purpose.1 37 For this reason, a foreign national's takings claim for property
located abroad should be cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.'
38
1. Hiding Behind Foreign Sovereigns
Cases such as Turney and Langenegger demonstrate that the United States
can "take" personal property under the Fifth Amendment indirectly by causing
a third-party sovereign to expropriate the property.139 Although Turney and
Langenegger reached different conclusions regarding whether there was a
compensable taking, the court in both cases employed similar reasoning to
determine that, even when a foreign sovereign performs the expropriation, the
United States may be held liable for just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, depending on its level of involvement.1 40 In Turney, the Court of
Claims relied on the close relationship between the United States and the
Philippines to hold that the Philippine embargo on the classified radar
equipment was the result of pressure by the United States, and therefore the
United States could be held liable for just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 141 Similarly, the Langenegger court relied on the relationship
between the U.S. and El Salvadoran governments in its analysis, but ultimately
distinguished "friendly persuasion" from "direct and substantial" involvement,
holding that the United States employed the former and, therefore, was not
liable for the taking.'
42
2. Distinguishing Friendly and Non-Friendly Aliens
In Russian Volunteer Fleet, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment protects the property of friendly aliens in the same way it protects
the property of U.S. citizens.143 Conversely, the Court in Eisentrager held that
alien enemies should be treated differently, and thus denied them use of the
writ of habeas corpus. 44 However, Eisentrager provided little guidance for
courts to determine how friendly aliens should be treated under the Fifth
136. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957); Stanley, supra note 20, at 253; supra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
137. See Kinne, supra note 130, at 226-27.
138. See id. at 231-35 (determining that international taking claims are not affected by the
political-question doctrine).
139. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Turney v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464-65 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see also Kinne, supra note 130, at 222.
140. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72; Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64.
141. Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64.
142. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72.
143. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481,489, 490-91 (1931).
144. United States v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776-77 (1950).
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Amendment. 145 Taken together, the relevant precedents counsel in favor of
permitting friendly aliens to bring Fifth Amendment takings claims against the
United States for just compensation. 146
C. The Substantial-Connection Test: The End of Mutuality?
In addition, when the United States acts outside of its jurisdiction, "its
powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as
are expressed in the Constitution.""1 47  However, the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez seemed to implicitly disclaim this statement.148 Loosening the reins
placed on the United States' power, Verdugo-Urquidez disregarded the concept
of mutuality. 49 Justice William Brennan, in his dissent, stated: "If we expect
aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our
Constitution .... ,5 Thus, by setting a higher, and almost impossible,
standard for aliens who reside outside of the United States, the Court
essentially allowed the United States to exercise the Constitution's limitations
and repudiate the established concept of mutuality.' 51 In the words of Justice
Brennan: "If we seek respect for law and order, we must observe these
principles ourselves. Lawlessness breeds lawlessness."
'1 52
Furthermore, Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases that address whether
foreign nationals who reside abroad may briny takings claims do not mention
substantial connections to the United States. Instead, in Turney--upheld in
El-Shiffa 154 and decided eighteen years after Verdugo-Urquidez-the Court of
Claims examined the nature of the relationship between the two sovereigns.'
55
Indeed, both the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit in El-Shifa
145. See Kinne, supra note 130, at 233. Kinne further notes that U.S. law "distinguishes
little, if at all, between citizens and friendly aliens." Id.
146. See id.
147. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 44 (1885)); see supra text accompanying note 30.
148. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
149. Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 284-85, 290.
152. Id. at 285 ("By respecting the rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other nations to
respect the rights of our citizens.").
153. See Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953). The majority of
cases that discuss the substantial-connection test, such as Verdugo-Urquidez, do not involve the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 442-43 (Fed. Cl.
2000). Instead, those cases address other Fifth Amendment clauses that apply to criminal
proceedings as well as the Fourth Amendment. Id.
154. EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see
supra Part 1.C.3.
155. Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 463-64.
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applied Turney instead of the substantial-connection test to hold that the
claimant had standing to bring its claim in federal court.
1 56
III. THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL-CONNECTION TEST
A. The Federal Circuit's Departure from Takings Jurisprudence
By dismissing Ms. Atamirzayeva's takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause because she lacked a substantial connection with
the United States, the Federal Circuit disregarded prior case law and the
principle that the right to own property is fundamental and inalienable and
extends to property possessed by aliens abroad. 157 In addition, the court relied
on Verdugo-Urquidez and ignored the essential concept of mutuali
158
Rather than looking to "objective factors and practical considerations,"' 5 the
court adopted Verdugo-Urquidez's "rigid and abstract"'160 test for the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, effectively
overturning Turney.
16 1
Ms. Atamirzayeva, although a citizen and resident of Uzbekistan, is a
friendly alien whose property was taken during a time of peace between the
United States and Uzbekistan. 16  The established case law regarding friendly
aliens should have protected Ms. Atamirzayeva's property to the same degree
as that of an American citizen.' 6 3 One could argue that the Federal Circuit'sdecision was appropriate because the United States played a minor and indirect
156. Vladeck, supra note 105, at 994. Even during times of war, there is nothing to prevent
aliens from going to court to redress a grievance, including when the question is whether the
individual is, in fact, an enemy. Id. at 965. Because alien enemies are not barred from going to
court while their government is at war with the United States, parity of reasoning would suggest
that friendly aliens may also come to court in times of peace.
157. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Ct. 2008); see also Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506-07 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
importance of allowing deference to fundamental property liberties explicit in the Fifth
Amendment).
158. See Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1327-29; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1957)
(discussing the concept of mutuality).
159. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258 (2008).
160. Reid, 354 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
161. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 2.
162. See U.S. Values Uzbekistan but Urges Rights Reform, CNN.coM, May 14, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/uzbeck.US/index.html; Ann Scott Tyson &
Robin Wright, Crackdown Muddies U.S.-Uzbek Relations, WASH. POST, June 4, 2005, at Al.
These articles show that, generally, the United States and Uzbekistan have enjoyed a solid
relationship. Specifically, "[t]he U.S. military has relied heavily on Uzbekistan since 2001 in
operations in Afghanistan." Id. However, the Uzbekistan government's suppression of the
turmoil in the Uzbek city of Andijan, described as the use of an unjustified level of force, did sour
the relationship. Id. Nevertheless, the United States continues to maintain a relatively friendly
relationship with Uzbekistan. Id
163. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) ("The petitioner
was an alien friend, and as such was entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
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role in the incident and local Uzbek officials were responsible for the
demolition of her cafeteria. 64 However, this is not a case of mere "friendly
persuasion. ' 65  Just as the United States requested that the Philippine
government place an embargo on the equipment at the air depot in Turney, the
U.S. Embassy officials asked local Uzbek officials to remove Ms.
Atamirzayeva from her cafeteria, a request with which Uzbek officials readily
complied.166 But for the United States' request, Ms. Atamirzayeva would still
have her cafeteria.
Unlike the request for systemic reform in Langenegger, the United States'
request in Atamirzayeva was to take Ms. Atamirzayeva's property. 167 More
specifically, Atamirzayeva satisfied the two conditions established in
Langenegger to determine "direct and substantial involvement," and trigger
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment: (1) the U.S. Embassy
officials directly asked the local officials to remove Ms. Atamirzayeva from
her cafeteria, and (2) the United States derived a significant benefit from the
taking of her property in the form of increased security.1 68 Although Ms.
Atamirzayeva failed to plead a voluntary substantial connection to the United
States, the United States clearly connected itself to her by urging the Uzbek
government to take her property.169  This is precisely the type of action
Langenegger proscribed.17  After Langenegger, the United States may no
longer hide behind the actions of a foreign sovereign when the United States is
the catalyst behind the sovereign's actions.
B. Impracticality of the Substantial-Connection Test
The substantial connection as applied to Fifth Amendment takings claims is
nonsensical and contrary to precedent. First, it is nonsensical because there
will always be a substantial connection between a Fifth Amendment takings
claimant and the U.S. government. Assuming the claim is legitimate, the
connection between the claimant and the government is established when the
164. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
165. Cf Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[T]he United
States cannot be held responsible merely because its activity is that of 'friendly' persuasion
regarding general policy .... ").
166. Compare Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008), with
Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 460 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
167. Compare Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1321, with Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567. In
Langenegger, the United States prompted El Salvador to propose reform that mandated the
expropriation of all agricultural properties over five hundred hectares. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at
1567. Once these estates were expropriated, they were converted into cooperatives. Id El
Salvador compensated the owners with nonnegotiable bonds that were less valuable than the
seized land. Id.
168. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1321; Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572.
169. Atamirzayeva, 524 F.3d at 1321 (noting that U.S. officials demanded that local police
destroy Ms. Atamirzayeva's cafeteria).
170. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572.
[Vol. 59:559
2010] Why Atamirzayeva v. United States Was Decided Incorrectly 585
government takes, or causes another sovereign to take, the claimant's property.
Moreover, as Atamirzayeva illustrates, the substantial-connection test would
allow the U.S. government to act contrary to the Constitution just because the
government acted beyond U.S. borders. The Fifth Amendment expressly
constrains the U.S. government's power to take private property for public use
without just compensation and unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment provides no textual limitation on the extraterritorial application of
its provisions.
17 1
Second, the substantial-connection test does not apply to the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause. The substantial-connection test articulated in
Verdugo-Urquidez was based on a "textual exegesis" of the phrase "the
people," which does not appear in the Takings Clause.1 7 2 Thus, the application
of the substantial-connection test to Takings Clause claims defeats the purpose
of the Clause and is antithetical to the underlying basis for the test, essentially
allowing the U.S. government to freely take private property for public use
notwithstanding the express constitutional limitation on such takings.
C. A Return to Mutuality and Practicality
The result achieved in Atamirzayeva by applying the substantial-connection
test could undermine the rights of U.S. citizens abroad. If the Unites States
does not respect the constitutional restraints on its power, and the rights of
others abroad, then it cannot expect other countries to respect the rights of U.S.
citizens abroad.
Moreover, in Atamirzayeva, none of the practical considerations present in
Eisentrager counsel against allowing Ms. Atamirzayeva from bringing her
claim: the U.S. government was not obligated to transport her witnesses to the
United States; the trial would have been held in the United States; and the
government would not have had to pay for her living expenses. 173 Instead, the
Federal Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Boumediene, should have based its
decision and analysis on practical considerations, objective factors, and
established principles of extraterritorial application of the Constitution, and,
more specifically, the Takings Clause.174
171. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 443 (Fed. Cl.
2000) (noting that Verdugo-Urquidez focused on the phrase "the people" in the Fourth
Amendment, which is not found in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).
173. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950). Unlike habeas corpus claims, the
Takings Clause can be applied and "enforced without inconvenience or political difficulty."
Tabacinic, supra note 12, at 620. One of the factors in Turney that led the court to find a
compensable taking was the lack of "inconvenience or practical difficulty" in granting judicial
relief. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see also supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
174. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized the extraterritorial applicability of the
Constitution and the protections that friendly aliens are entitled to under the
Takings Clause. However, the Court has not determined guidelines for when a
friendly alien can bring such a claim before a United States court. 175  The
Federal Circuit has only added to the confusion surrounding this issue. Rather
than following established precedent, the Federal Circuit digressed and took a
formal, stricter approach.' Just as the United States respects the property
rights of its citizens within its boundaries, it must respect the property rights of
aliens outside of its borders. Instead of applying the substantial-connection
test to Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claims, especially those involving
friendly foreign nationals, courts should once again consider the notions of
mutuality and practicality. Until this happens, the United States will continue
to harm friendly aliens such as Ms. Atamirzayeva, and no remedy will be
available to them.
175. See, e.g., Tabacinic, supra note 12, at 621 (stating that the Federal Circuit's decision in
El-Shifa demonstrates the inherent conflict between Verdugo-Urquidez and Turney).
176. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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